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There is no single industry more important to the economic
welfare and world influence of a nation, both in times of peace and
war, than its shipping industry. Shipping has played an important
role in the development of the United States. With independence,
the influence of the maritime advocates was apparent. One of the
first Acts of Congress passed in 1789? contained a maritime flavor
which established discriminatory taxes and duties against foreign
ships engaged in commerce with the new nation, the United States. 1
Additional legislation which still remains in effect, followed which
established cabotage and documentary restrictions. Thus, from the
beginning, the United States Government has taken an active role in
the maritime affairs of the nation in the belief that a strong
merchant marine must be capable of responding to the needs of
national security and is essential for economic prosperity and
national prestige.
In the compact, modern world, merchant shipping and national
security are more closely related than ever before. By its very
nature, shipping spans the nearly three-fourths of the world that
is covered by water. Not only does shipping provide access to
^-Military Sea Transport Service p . 1
.

sources of vital materials and resources, but it also provides the
secure means of safeguarding a nation's war-making potential and its
ability to project that potential to the war fronts of the world.
In both World War I and World War II the United States were found
short in merchant shipping because it had relied too heavily upon
foreign owned and operated ships to carry its import and export
trade
.
As clear as this importance may seem, the nation's maritime
history is in a state of decline. Voices from all segments of the
American scene appeal to those responsible for the nation's welfare
to improve the states of the merchant marine. The matter is dis-
cussed almost daily in the newspapers, in the magazines, and in the
halls of Congress, but the decline of the merchant marine continues.
This is a problem of large dimensions that is worthy of investiga-
tion.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature and causes
of the decline in the merchant marine, and the consequences of this
decline or national security as well as economic position in the
free world. Further, the interest of this study is to survey
methods by which the merchant marine might be revitalized and
modernized.
The study does not include domestic merchant marine operations
including coastal trade and trade soley associated with the Great
Lakes and the inland waterways. Quantatlve data referred to in the
paper includes information only thru fiscal year 1965. This
measure was considered necessary because of the temporary nature of
•
the impact on the shipping industry resulting from the Vietnam
build up throughout fiscal year 1966.
Chapter II will review the history and background of American
ocean shipping including the effects of significant legislation, on
subsidies and flags of convenience shipping.
Chapter III will discuss the existing need for a merchant
marine from the point of view of national security in time of war
and economic progress in peace time. Also included is a review of
the existence and need for the National Defense Reserve Fleet and
the Military Sea Transport Service.
Chapter IV will examine the current state of health of the
merchant marine with respect to its present quantity and quality of
equipment, participation in United States foreign trade.
Chapter V will explore the impact of technology, recent
government and industry studies into the existing problems in the
immensely complex merchant marines, and to the extent possible, the
future trends affecting the industry.
Chapter VI will summarize Chapter II thru V and state the
conclusion and recommendations as the manner which might best
serve to revitalize and modernize the merchant marine as a respon-
sive, efficient and effective segment of United States industry.

CHAPTER II
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN
OCEAN SHIPPING
Background to World War I
The early history of our country Is tied very closely to the
sea. The original colonies were dependent upon sea transport, and
as a result healthy shipping and shipbuilding industries sprang into
existence almost from the start. The early Americans 1 inheritance
of capital, science, skilled labor, and technological advances from
Europe were responsible for the colonies' early and rapid economic
growth. Tobacco, cooton, rice, lutober, and fur all found a welcome
and lucrative market in Europe. By 1775, colonial trade with
England accounted for thiryt-three percent of the Mother Country's
total trade. 1
The shipbuilding industry of the United States was a healthy
maritime asset by 1776 and consisted of small shipyards from Maine
to Georgia. The skilled craftsmen were abundant, and the best
timber available for production of ships. 2 The best double-decked
-'Carl E. McDowell and Helen M. Gibbs, Ocea n Transportation
,
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1952*) , P- 17.
2Ibid., p. 20.

American ships could be produced at about $3^ per ton while Great
Britain's costs were $55 per ton or over. 1-
During the Revolutionary War, the British Navy sunk or capturec
nearly one thousand American ships, virtually destroying the shipp-
ing and commerce industry in this n3w nation.
^
In 1789* Congress passed a law which limited American regis-
tration to only those ships built in the United States, and owned
by United States citizens. This law was aimed at protecting
American ship builders. Congress also helped American ship opera-
tors by granting sizeable reductions in customs on goods imported
on United States ships.
3
After 1790, United States shipping found the United States
flag in every port where ingenuity could secure access and trading
ability could secure profits. The tonnage r3gistered for foreign
trade increased from 124,000 tons in 1790 to 98l ; 000 tons in 1810.
Imports and exports transported in United States ships increased
during this period; imports from about 18 per cent and exports
from 30 per cent to 90 per cent. During this period from 1800 to
18^40 nearly 90 per cent of all United States imports and exports
were transported in United States ships. These golden days saw a




2Paul M. Zeis, American Shipping Policy
,
(Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1933), p. 1-3-
3Ibid.
^Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers, U.S.
Government Assistance to the Merchant Marine, 195^ > P* 8.

Capital for further expansion of the merchant fleet was drawn
away from the sea during the mid-nineteenth century. England
devloped the iron steamship while the United States Clipper shi
builders were complacent and reluctant to change. 1 By i860, nearly
all passengers and mail were carried by foreign ships, the great
p
majority of which were iron screw vessels. In spite of efforts
to keep the merchant fleet active in foreign trade, there was a
decline in United States shipping for the next 50 years. United
States ships transported nearly 90 percent of the nation's seaborne
foreign trade during the first half of the nineteenth century. By
187O, this percentage had declined to nearly 36 percent. Trade
further declined to about 9 percent in 1910. These years saw a
new eclipse by the United States merchant fleet in foreign trade
at a time when the nation's total wealth increased many fold.
3
World War I
The eve of World War I found the United States almost com-
pletely unprepared to meet the emergency ahead. The United States
witnessed a sudden crisis when the ships of the other countries
were withdrawn and pressed into war service.^ Exports to Europe
almost ceased and United States warehouses filled to over-capacity
with cargo waiting export and American exporters were at a point
^-Robert R. Russel A History of the American Economic System
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crof ts, 1964), p. 152.
McDowell and Gibbs, p. 29.
3u.S. Maritime Commission, Handbook of Merchant Marine Devel -
opment and Regulation in the United States" (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1940), p. 177.
^UiS. Bureau of Naval Personnel, Military Sea Transport Service
(U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 2-3.

of desperation. Freight rates had increased as much as one
thousand percent. Operators were gladly buying ships for $300 per
ton that could have been purchased for $60 per ton before the out-
break of war.
The great increases in shipping rates brought about pressures
for government to move in. Congress passed legislation permitting
American owners of foreign-flag ships to register them in the
United States, employ them in United States foreign trade, and si-il
with the original crew regardless of nationality. These transfers
totaled 650,000 tons by 1917.
The Shipping Act of 1916 .
The next significant legislation affecting the Merchant Marine
was the Shipping Act of 1916. This Act provided for the establish-
ment of a naval auxiliary, a naval reserve and a merchant marine
for the purpose of meeting the requirements of the country's
commercial and military needs. These needs had formerly been
partially served by ships of foreign nations, however, World War I
had brought on a shortage that foreign flags could no longer
fulfill.
The United Shipping Board was created by this Act. The
Shipping Board was authorized to form the Emergency Fleet Corpora-
tion for the purchase, construction, lease, charter, and operation
of merchant ships. As a result of the efforts of this corporation.
IZeis, p. 81.
2Milltary Sea Transport Service , p . 3
.

2,313 merchant ships were built from 1913 to 1922. However, most
of these ships were not delivered in time to respond to the needs
of the war. 1
The Act did not in itself grant federal aid for the construc-
tion and operation of privtte. ships, but it did promote an
emergency shipbuilding program. The Act further served in a regu-
latory nature in establishing a code of shipping.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920
After cessation of World War I hostilities, another major
problem confronted the country; that of disposing of a merchant
fleet which had grown in excess of the nation's postwar require-
ments. The Merchant Marine Act of 19202 was enacted to deal with
this disposal problem. It authorized the United States Postmaster
General to negotiate and contract for the carrying of mail over
such lines and at such prices as might be agreed upon by the United
States Shipping Board and the Postmaster General. This Act also
provided the establishment of services employing government-owned
ships and their ultimate transfer to private ownership; the selling
of ships; the establishment of essential trade routes; the repair
and operation of ships under certain conditions; and the granting
of loans for the construction of new ships from funds obtained
frcm the sale of old government ships.
lMcDowell and Gibbs, op. clt ., p. 253-254.
2U.S. Statutes at Large , Vol. 41, Part I, p. 588.

There was little Incentive for ship construction since the
operators could purchase ships from the government's emergency
fleet at attractive prices, ($99 per deadweight ton in 1920
reduced to $30 per ton in 1921). Between 1922 and 1928, not a
single ship was constructed in the United States for transoceanic
I
service.
One of the interests of this Act was to provide the basis for
a more permanent peacetime shipping policy. In actual practice
some Inadequacies became apparent. The contracts were lax and
were abused by both government and private operators. The govern-
ment aid provided was just enough to become a permanent expense
and not enough to produce the strong Merchant Marine that was
desired.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1928
Because of the results of the 1920 Act, tne United States
Congress passed the Merchant Marine Act of 1928.3 Salient features
of this Act were the increased realism in the determination of the
need for and designation of ocean-mail routes and increased compen-
sation to the ship operators for services rendered. This new
legislation resulted in the negotiation of contracts with thirty-
h
one steamship companies.
^McDowell and Gibb<s, p. 257.
McDowell and Gibbs, op. clt
., p. 255.
3U. S. Statutes at Large , Vol. 45, Part I, p. 689.
^McDowell and Gibbs, op. clt ., p. 256.
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This Act Increased the size of the revolving fund which the
1920 Act had authorized for ship construction loans. The ocean-
mall contract conditions called for replacement of old tonnage and
decreased rates of Interest for construction loans. The ship
replacement program began moving. Under the provisions of this Act
thirty-one new ships were constructed and forty-one old ships were
modernized.
1
This Act was an improvement over the previous legislation.
However, it had several defects which were summarized by the
Magnuson Committee in its 1950 report:
First, the compensation granted American lines
was not based upon actual conditions encountered on
the particular route served, so that some lines got
more than they needed, while others competing with




legal interpretation of a
of the Act. . . .
Second, the ship replacement provis
somewhat too laxly enforced. Third, loa
building were made at varying rates, so
lines got money at almost nominal intere
while others paid several
an element of unfairness,
due to favoritism, but to
carelessly worded section
Fourth, there was inadequate supervision
to which subsidy money was put by the li
or one or two companies paying themselve
and dividens when their companies were a
bankrupt. Fifth, there was a complaint
violation of law, contracts were so word



















8lst Cong. 2d Sess
1950), p. 109.
Marine Study and Investigation 1, S. Report 2^94,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
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The Merchant Marine Act of 1936
Title I of this Act was a declaration of policy and stated:
It is necessary for the national defense and
development of its foreign and domestic commerce
that the United States shall have a merchant marine
(a) sufficient to carry its domestic water-borne
commerce and a substantial portion of the water-
borne export and import foreign commerce of the
United States and to provide shipping service on
all routes essential for maintained the flow of such
domestic and foreign water-borne commerce at all
times, (b) capable of serving as a naval and military
auxiliary in time of war or national emergency,
(c) owned and operated under the United States
flag by citizens of the United States insofar
as may be practicable, and (d) composed of the best-
equipped, safest, and most suitable types of
vessels, constructed in the United States and manned
with a trained and efficient citizen personnel.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United
States to foster the development and encourage the
maintenance of such a merchant marine.
The United States is today, still operating under the basic
policy described above. In order to comply with this policy,
subsidies are paid for the construction and operation of ships
built in the United States and operated under the United States
flag on essential foreign trade routes. These subsidies are
designed to compensate the operators for the higher United States
building and operating needs.
A Federal regulatory agency (United States Maritime Commission]
was created by this Act. Congress provided that the Commission
be responsible for carrying out the purposes of the Act through
the following:
a. Construction-differential subsidies on vessels
built in the United States for use on essential foreign
trade routes.
Mj.S. Statues at Large, Vol. 49, Part I, p. 1985.
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b. Operating-differential subsidies on vessels,
utilized on essential foreign trade routes.
c. Financial aid in the construction of vessels,
either with or without construction-differential sub-
sidies, by deferment of a portion of the purchase
price (granting loans).
d. Applying an allowance of credit to the
purchase price of new vessels for obsolete vessels
taken in exchange.
e. Restrictions on the sale or use of vessels
owned or acquired by the Commission.
f. Payment for national-defense features incorp-
orated in the vessels.
g. Low interest rates on construction loans.
h. Establishment of reserve funds with attendant
income tax benefits to the vessel operators.
i. Construction of vessels for chartering to
private operators.
j. Additional subsidies to offset the effect of
Government aid paid to foreign competitors.
k. Guarantee of ship mortgages.
1. Training of citizens to serve on American
merchant vessels.
m. Prescribing of minimum manning scales, mini-
mum wage scales, and minimum working conditions for all
officers and crews employed on vessels receiving an
operating-differential subsidy, and other benefits to
American Seamen.
n. Authority to requisition or purchase vessels
when advisable for the security of the national defense
or during national emergencies.!
Legislation After the Merchant Marine Act of 1936
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 contained a comprehensive
program, which could result in an up-to-date and highly effective
Merchant Marine. The United States Maritime Commission had little
more than started on a long-range program which the Act had
authorized when World War II started. At the peak of the war,
there were 100 yards and 650,000 workers building merchant ships.
^United States Comptroller General, Audit of Federal Maritime
Board and Maritime Administration, Department of Commerce and
Predecessor Agency
,
letter from Comptroller General of the United
States, b2d Cong., 1st Sess., House Doc. 93 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1951). PP- 111-112.
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This was In addition to twelve private and eleven government
yards building United States Navy ships. An ocean going vessel
was launched at an average rate of one every six hours for four
years. The shipbuilding program which the United States embarked
upon to support the war effort produced 5,592 merchant ships.
When the war ended, this large inventory of ships was far in excess
of the country's needs. Therefore, new legislation was required
which would authorize the sale of those ships considered to be in
excess of the nation's military and commercial needs. 1
During the early stages of World War II it was apparent that
some device was needed to allocate available shipping on an
urgency of need. This requirement brought about the creation of
the War Shipping Administration with broad powers to charter,
purchase, operate, Insure, repair, and requisition ships.
Together with the Army Transport Service; the Navy Transport
Service and the Fleet Service Forces, the har Shipping Administra-
tion, through the Joint Transportation Committee under the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, worked out the allocation of all shipping for the
National Defense.
3
Ninety-five percent of all cargo was carried by the merchant
fleet, dry and liquid cargo shipments totaled: in 1942 -44,117,000
long tons; in 1943 - 62,113,000 long tons; in 1944 - 78,553,000
long tons; in 1945 - 83,460.000 long tons. During the last year




^Military Sea Transport Service, 1962, p. 8.
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of the war 9>000 tons were delivered every hour of every day.l
The Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 prescribed procedures
and prices for disposing of the Government-owned fleet of ships.
Ship sales were authorized to citizens and non-citizens, with
citizens being given preferential treatment. The 1946 Act estab-
lished a firm pricing:policy of fixed statutory prices by type of
ship, making allowances for the cost of getting ships in condition,
absence of standard features, the presence of desirable features,
and normal depreciation. Minimum prices by ship type were
established, and a 25 percent down payment was required with the
balance to be carried by the Government at 3*5 percent interest.
2
The sale was ultimately terminated in 1951 by which time 58l dry-
cargo ships and 266 tankers had been sold. The remaining ships
were transferred permanently to the National Defense Reserve fleet
3
The start of the Korean conflict found the United States in
a far better position for ocean shipping than ay previous war.
This was largely due to the hu,ge Inventory of leftover construction
from World War II. The Maritime Administration (MARAD) had Just
come into existence, but lacked stature. The Military Sea Trans-
port Service was formed two years earlier and had the authority
and facilities to meet the challenge. In short, maritime shipping
was never any real problem after the initial surge requirements
normally peculiar to an unexpected outbreak of war.
1Ibid., p. 4.
2U. S. Statutes at Large
,
Vol. 60, Part 1, p. 41.
^McDowell and Glbbs, p. 116.
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The long-Range Shipping Act of 1952 provided for construction
differential subsidies for all ships operated in the foreign
trade of the United States. This legislation included tankers
and tramps which had not been included in the 1936 Act. The 1952
Act also decreased the age requirement for tr8de-in allowance
from 17 to 12 years, and broadened the availability of construction
reserve funds for use in the reconstruction and reconditioning
of ships, and provided for recomputation of the life expectancy
of the reconstructed or modernized ship. This legislation was a
decided step forward in overcoming the weakness of obsolescence
which threatened the modern United States Merchant Marine.
Over the years, numberous minor amendments to the various
Merchant Marine laws have been enacted. As the 86th Congress
came to an end in i960, several changes in shipping policy were
enacted. Among the more important were:
1. An increase in the allowable construction-differential
subsidy from 50 to 55 percent (meaning that now 55 percent of the
cost of construction in United States shipyards can be paid by
the Government if foreign cost studies show that foreign construc-
tion would be 45 percent or less of domestic construction cost).
2. A ban was enacted against the use of ships in domestic
trade which are modified by the use of major foreign-built
components (this restriction goes into effect only for those
modifications which were initialed prior to enactment, and aimed
primarily at the use of foreign-constructed midbodies for use
•^•U.S. Statutes at Large . Vol. 60. Part I, p. 760.
2Ibid., Vol. 74, Part I, p. 362.
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in the dry-bulk cargo domestic trade). 1
3. Legislation was enacted in order to permit nonsubsidized
operators to trade in their old tonnage for more efficient ships
not in the reserve fleet.
4. The useful life of subsidized ships was extended from 20
to 25 years for ships delivered after 1946.
3
The Subsidy
The United States Merchant Marine has operated under various
programs of government assistance or forms of subsidy from as
early as 1845- These early subsidy programs failed at their
primary objective of maintaining an adequate Merchant Marine.
Initially, aid to shipping lines was accomplished through
ocean-mail contracts which were authorized by Congress in 1845.
Payments were made to four shipping companies for almost fifteen
years, at which time the aid was withdrawn. Ocean-mail contracts
were again authorized by Congress in 1864. The life of this Act
was thirteen years. Another mail contract which lasted for nearly
thirty years, was authorized by Congress in 1891.^
The success of the ocean-mail subsidies can be judge by their
effects on United States shipping companies and upon the merchant











under the 1845 legislation managed to survive into the twentieth
century. The other three folded when the Government subsidy
was withdrawn in I858. One subsidized shipping company managed to
survive the withdrawal. of the 1864 authorized subsidies, but only
by entering into a ten year contract with Brazil. That company
folded in 1893. The 1891 Act proved equally ac useless. This is
illustrated by the fact that by 1910 the proportion of the nation's
foreign commerce carried in United States flag ships had dropped
from its I85O level of 73 percent to 3.7 percent in 1910. 1
The operating-differential subsidy payments are determined
and stated as percentages of the subsidizable expenses of the
ship operator. Separate rates are determine for each type of
expense, each trade route, and take into consideration each foreign
competitor. The process of calculating these rates is complex and
requires a large amount of foreign cost information which must be
obtained on a continuous basis. The only accurate source of
such information is from the foreign flag operators who are the
competitors of the United States subsidized operators. In most
cases, these foreign operators are not willing to release their
exact cost; therefore, the Maritime Administration is required to
obtain this information from indirect sources and to make assump-
p
tlons.
There have been general increases in the subsidy differentials
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1937-1946 $ 48.7 $ 32.1 $ 16.6




1949 44.2 14.5 29.6
1950 57.8 9.2 48.6
1951 71.9 25.7 46.1
1952 89.3 25.7 63.6
1953 106.2 12.9 93.3
1954 107.3 2.8 104.5
1955 115.1 11.9 103.1
1956 128.1 22.4 105.7
1957 147.7 25.3 122.4
1958 147.1 6.4 140.6
1959 159.5 ;4 159.1
i960 168.0 5.1 162.9
1961 171.7 1.9 169.7
1962 184.7 4.1 180.5
1963 192.2 -1.2 193.4
1964 208.7 1.2 207.5
1965
Total$2
192.0 \ 1.1 190.
,330.5 $195.4 $2,135.0
Source: Maritime Administration Annual Report 1966.
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the area of wages, which is the greatest single operating cost to
both the ship operator and to the Government for those ships
entitled to subsidy payments. The Government reimburse the
operators for an average of seventy-two percent of the actual
wages paid every crewman aboard a subsidized vessel. Expressed
another way, of the $200-million annual direct operating subsidies
paid out by the Government, eighty-three percent is allocated to
shipboard wages.
Crews of ships registered under foreign flags operate at a
lower wage rate than crews of United States ships, Some foreign
ships are manned with mixed crews which consist of European officers
and European and Asian seamen. Non-European seamen are paid lower
wages than those paid to European seamen. Strong maritime unions
in the United States have been instrumental in demanding and
obtaining wages for United States seamen at rates far in excess of
o
those paid to the seamen who man foreign ships.
The construction-differential subsidy applies to ships that
are to be used in the foreign commerce of the United States. The
effect, again, is to equalize foreign and domestic shipbuilding
costs. This subsidy places the United States operator on an equal
--U.S. Department of Commerce, This is Marad (Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office 1965), p. 13.
2Panel on Wartime Use of the U.S. Merchant Marine., The Role
of the U.S. Merchant Marine in National Security
., (Washington:





There are other important means by which the government
intervenes to aid the merchant marine, other than direct subsidies.
The most important of these is by cargo preference. In 190^ , a
statute was passed requiring all military cargoes to be shipped in
American flag ships.
In 195^, by Public Law 83-6M, the Merchant Marine Act of 1936
was emended to provide for fifty percent of ell the gross tonnage
of government financed cargo being transported on ocean vessels to
be carried on privately owned U.S. flag commercial vessels. This
law includes cargoes generated by government agencies for:
b) supplies for U.S. armed forces oversease
\>S military aid to allies
'c) economic assistance cargoes under the Agency
for International Development
lipments under Export-Import bank loans
Public Law 83-^80, agricultural shipments
(d) sh:
(e) l
The cost of this indirect subsidy is the difference between
U.S. ship rates and the world market rate. It has been estimated
by the Maritime Administration as about $80-million annually.
The "Flag of Convenience "
All United States Merchant Marine ships are not eligible to
participate in the subsidy program. Legislation, policy, types of
trade practices, fmc\ economic factors have led many United States
ship owners to seek more advantageous environments in which to
operate their ships. The result has been that many United States
VThis is Mared, P. Ik.
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basis with the foreign operator who builds his ships et lower cost
in foreign yards. *•
The plans and specifications of ships conctracted under this
subsidy must receive approval of the Department of the Navy to in-
sure the inclusion of national defense features. The cost of these
features is paid for by the Government. The Merchant Marine Act
of 1936 provides that the construction subsidy shall not exceed
one-third the United States construction cost of the ship (exclud-
ing the national defense features). In cases where the Federal
Maritime Board possesses convincing evidence that the actual differ-
ential exceeds that percentage, it may grant an allowance not to
exceed fifty-five percent. Since June, 1963> the construction
subsidy allowance has averaged fifty-percent per ship. For the 14-
18 merchant ships built annually, the government's contribution to
the ship owners is currently averaging $120-mlllion per year.
3
The construction-differential subsidy can be considered as an
aid to the ship owner and as an aid to the United States ship-
building industry, insuring that shipbuilding capability will be
available in time of national emergency. This ability is dependent
upon available shipyard facilities, experience ship-building person-
nel, and an adequate supply of materials and components.
llbid., p. 51.
^Elmer A. Lewis, Laws plating to Shipping and the Merchant
Marine
,
(Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 195b),
p. 2bb.
3u»S. Naval -Institut e Proceedings , January 3, 1967, p. 75.
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ship owners have registered their ships under foreign flags.
1
This shipping is registered under nine North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) countries' flags as well as under the popular-
ly termed "flags of convenience." The "flags of convenience' term
applies primarily to United States-owned shipping which is regis-
tered under the flags of Panama, Liberia, and Honduras (PANLIBHON)
Although shipping which is owned by United States citizens, and
registered under any flag other than that of the United States is
technically registered under a 'flag of convenience," shipping
that is registered with NATO allies, all of whom are traditionally
maritime nations, are not under effective control of the United
States. These NATO nations have agreed to commit the preponder-
ance of their merchant fleet to a common pool in the event of a
NATO war. However, no formal agreement exists for making this
shipping available to the United States government in the case of
a United States emergency.
^
On the other hand, the United States citizen-owned portion
of the PANLIBHON flag fleets is considered to be under effective
control of the United States government because of the absence
of operation control restrictions in the existing maritime laws
of those three nations. In addition, the small shipping require-
ments of these three nations would create only a marginal require-
ment for shipping in the event of a war.^




^Boleslaw A. Boczek. Flags of Convenience (Cnmbfid^e, Mass:
Cambridge University Press, l§b2), pp. 2bb-290.
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The composition of the United States controlled portion of
the PANLIBHON flag fleet amounts to 4^3 ships of over 12.3 million
deadweight tons. 1 About 300 of these PANLIBHON registered ships
are tankers with deadweight tonnage amounting to nearly 8 million
tons. The ships are employed in transporting the majority of the
petroleum in United States foreign trade. Availability of this
fleet of tankers combined with those now in service under the
United States flag (plus those in moth balls) would make about 700
tankers available to the United States in time of an emergency.
Additionally, the nearly 120 general cargo ships, the 80 odd dry-
bulk carriers, about 15 reefers and nearly 10 passenger-cargo
ships would add a significant contribution to the United States
sealift capability. 2
Attacks by maritime labor unions against "flags of convenience"
operations and objections on the part of some of the United States'
allies to the continued use of PANLIBHON flag fleets have been
prevalent. These labor and foreign interests may normally be
expected to continue their efforts toward the eventual elimination
of this arrangement.
3
Because of the increased difficulty of operating United States
flag ships in direct competition with foreign-flag tankers, more
and more United States oil companies are registering their tankers
under foreign flags. McDowell and Gibbs explained reasons for this
lU.S. Maritime Administration, Changing Patterns in U.S. Trade
and Shipping Capacity
,
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office
19&5) P« 10
•








more than a decade ago when they wrote:
. . .(1) American operating costs are 25 percent
greater than for a foreign-flag ship. (2) The cost of
constructing tankers in this country is greater than
in foreign shipyards and until mid-1952, tankers were
excluded from the benefits of the construction differ-
ential subsidies provided for under the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936. (3) Employment in the trade
between foreign ports is not attractive to American
seamen, who prefer to serve aboard vessels stopping
at United States ports. (4) Difficulties involved
in foreign exchange induce American oil companies
to build ships abroad and to operate them under
foreign registry. 1
Recent United States construction costs have been estimated
to be at least twice as much as foreign ship construction costs.
In addition, further increases in operating costs have occurred.
For example, American seamen earn, on an average, well over $3 an
hour. This wage is four times as much as Japanese seamen wages. 2
The attractiveness of operating under a foreign flag can be
easily recognized by a look at the used-tanker market. "Marine
Engineering/Log," in 1957. found that a T-2 tanker registered under
the U.S. flag and that had passed survey in 1956, sold for $3-
million, while a foreign-flag T-2 of like condition was bringing
a price of $4-million. This was at the time of a relative world
shortage of tankers.
3
Another indication of such attractiveness is apparent when
the outstanding orders are observed for United States shipping
interest in foreign shipyards. For example, from the end of World
War II to the period March, 1955, United States or affiliated
interests had placed orders for 302 ships amounting to six million
McDowell and Gibbs, pp. 117-119.
2Forbes, June 15, 1965, p. 2^-25.





deadweight tons. During the next sixteen months, the cumulative
orders from foreign shipbuilding yards grew to 53^ ships, totaling
over twelve million deadweight tons.
This important volume of shipbuilding business placed in
foreign countries by United States interests far exceeded the total
business contracted for with United States shipbuilders in the past
World War II years. During the thirteen year period ending
31 December, i960, United States shipyards completed 3^7 major
merchant ships which totaled nearly eight million deadweight tons
for government and private shipping interests. This amounted to
slightly less than one-third of the total tonnage ordered from
abroad by these same shipping interests in the post-war years.
In summary, the United States has, since the early days of
the Republic, displayed a sharp interest and very active hand in
the Merchant Marine. Except for the first half of the 19th century 3
the Merchant Marine has found it necessary to rely on legislation
to maintain its very existence.
The United States Merchant Marine for the past 100 years, has
been experienceing an up-again down-again state of financial well
being. Further, despite the government subsidies, the United States
entered both World Wars totally ill-prepared from a Merchant
shipping capability view point. Finally, as a result of inadequate
monetary incentives, a very significant portion of the post World
War II shipping capacity has transferred its flag of registry to
^
•Marine Engineering/Log , August 1956, p. 123.
2Marine Engineering/Log , May i960, pp. 1^9, 173.
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Panama, Hondurus and Liberia in an effort to reduce high operating




WHY THE NEED FOR A MERCHANT FLEET
The very nature of the United States Merchant Marine is a
complex grouping of interacting factors. Few can dispute history
in that the powers that have dominated the political and economic
affairs of the world have been seapowers.
Many writers have taken the position that seapower, in terms
of a merchant marine, is a key element in a country's commercial
policy of influence on its own economy and the economy of other
2
nations. The daily average of merchant ships at sea engaging in
trade is 9>000> carrying 98»25 percent of the entire world's
foreign trade.
Peacetime Need
Perhaps the most important need for a merchant marine in
time of peace is insurance of on existing capability for at least
minimum support of both the nation's economy and the defense
^McDowell and Glbbs
, p. 30.
^Allen R. Ferguson, et al. The Economic Value of the United
States Merchant Marine . (Evenston, Illinois., Northwestern Univers
Press, 19bl), p. 243.
3u.S. Congress House Committee on Merchant Marines and
Fisheries, Operation Steel Pike I Hearings
,
(Washington: U.S.




establishment at the onset of any war.
For many decades, the United States produced more raw mater-
ials than it consumed. Today, however, the United States has
changed from a raw material surplus nation to a raw material
deficit nation. As the world's largest trade nation, the United
States funnels almost half of the world's output of raw materials
p
thru its huge industrial complex.
There are twenty-four essential strategic materials imported
into the United States by sea. (see table II). It is interesting
to note the United States imports eighty-six percent of its
bauxite, essential in aluminum production and ninety percent of
chromite, used to harden steel. Furthermore, the United States
does not have a single domestic source for asbestos or tin, and
crude oil and iron ore to satisfy our industrial needs are being
imported at ever increasing rates.
In I960, the United States imported 35.0 million tons ( or 245
shiploads) of iron ore, and 372 million barrels (410 tankers loads)
of crude oil. By 1975 > the importation of iron ore will double
and the import of crude oil will increase, the importaexport trade
is expected to keep pace with the higher Gross National Product
in both dollar value and tonnage. 2( see Table III) The United States''
share of world shipping tonnage will slip from 8.5 percent in 1966,
to 3.3 percent in 1985> if the United States continues its present
policy.
1Zeis, p. 214.
^Military Sea Transport Service
, p. 5.
3oPeratlon Steel Pike I Hearings , p. 109.
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TABLE II - IMPORT OF ESSENTIAL RAW MATERIALS 1
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^Based on continuation of present maritime policies.
2Dollars in billions.
lU.S. Interagency Task Force on Maritime Policy. The Merchant
Marine in National Defense and Trade (Washington 1965) p. 4b-
7
and Exhibit II, p. 3.
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Finally, the third peactime need for a merchant fleet, is
the insurance of the Country's ability to carry its own foreign
trade when other dominant maritime nations become involved in a
major conflict
.
There are substantial domestic, economic benefits generated
from the maritime industry, (including the merchant protion of
the shipbuilding industry). The maritime industry generates
annually about $1.5-million in Gross National Products, pays about
$75-million in corporate taxes, and its members contribute about
$80-million in personnel income tax. In addition, shipping
services by United States flag ships conserves about $800-million
in the balance of payments position of the United States.
Wartime Need
Both by treaty and military assistance agreements, the
United States is committed to the defense of approximately sixty
nations throughout the free world. Strategic objectives dictate
that we have a dry-cargo fleet to transport equipment and supplies,
tankers to carry huge quantities of fuel and transports to move
troops.
3
The Korean conflict figures show that for every soldier or








required to be shipped in for the initial support and a fresh
ton of supplies was required every month for every Ban. Thus,
for a half-million man conflict as in the case of Viet Nam, three
and a half million tons must be moved for the initial troop build-
up and a half-million tons per month must be added, or nineteen-
million tons of military cargo in the first year.
Table III shows that in 1966, the portion of our foreign
trade carried in United States flag ships wast expected to equal
less than twenty-nine million tons. Thus, there would be little
left of the merchant fleet to carry strategics, raw materials, or
finished products to those free nations looking to the United
States for defense and economic support.
Based on the military needs for shipping and the urgent
requirements of the civilian economy under emergency conditions,
a fleet of active ships plus reserve ships of adequate quality
would be required as. follows: 400 general cargo ships, each with
a capacity of 600,000 bale cubic feet at 15 knots, 100 bulk cargo
ships of 22,000 dead weight tons at sixteen knots, and 500 tankers
p
of 115,000 barrel capacity at fifteen knots. With the continuing
trend and rate of decline in the size of our merchant fleet, by
1985, the United States will find it almost impossible to satisfy
the military and economic needs with the United States flag
merchant shipping alone.
The Military Sea Transport Servlce(MSTS) finds its origin in
^
-Military Sea Transport Service, p. 380.
^The Me rchant Marine in National Defense and Trade






the National Security Act of 19^*7 > which instructed the Secretary
of Defensetto take steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication in
the areas of procurement, supply and transportation. On 1 October
19^9* MSTS was activated to mate better use of military assets and
provide better allocation of shipping between military and
civilian needs. MSTS functions much the same as a commercial
carrier service. The responsibility for cargo begins when it is
finally stowed on board and accepted by the ships' Captain, and
ends when free on board at destination. The separate services
are responsible for port operation including stevedoring. 2 A
more important responsibility of MSTS is the administration of
priorities for ocean shipping in accordance with the policies and
guidance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 3 MSTS has no authority to
sponsor movements of either personnel or cargo and must be reim-
bursed for all services rendered.
An agreement between the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of Commerce executed in 195^ > provides that after full
use has been made of the MSTS active fleet, any further capability
required will be purchased:
1. from berth line (point to point) shipping for less than
ship load lots;
2. from voluntarily offered American-owned chartered ships
for ship load lots;
-








3. by operation of government-owned ships under general-
agency agreements with the Maritime Administration and assigned
to MSTS;
4. or when no United States flag shipping is available,
foreign-flag ships may be used. 1
The size of the MSTS active fleet as of the end of the fiscal
year 1965, was 183 ships, including forty-five United States flag
commercial charter and six foreign flag.
The Justification for having an MSTS in time of war is
most apparent; however, its justification in time of peace must
be looked at more carefully. Thru numerous and scattered world-
wide defense commitments, the United States Armed Forces are
spread out in most of the remote parts of the world. To support
these forces, it is necessary to maintain a permanent logistic
supply channel of support. Service of this type, requires ships
to travel to places not normally served by regular merchant ship
sailings that would be compatible with the military needs. In
addition, this logistic support service requires that the delivery
ships be outfitted with special cargo handling gear to move such
things as sixty-ton tanks, helicopters, fixed wing aircraft,
ammunition, etc.
The National Defense Reserve Fleet; Following World War II
large quantities of excess merchant tonnage was placed in reserve,
for the purpose of rapid reactivation in time of emergency.-^
^








During three world crises since World War II these fleets have
proven invaluable. The cost of keeping the NRDF since 1945 is
estimated at between $250-million and $325-million. It is
estimated that the NDRF activation in the Korean conflict saved
the nation between $2.5-billion 8nd $3-billlon, 8nd during thr
Suez crisis, about a half billion dollars. 1
The ships of the NDRF, for the most part, are in excess of
twenty years old and at abest have little life left beyond the
next few years. Due to age and deterioration, the fleet declined
by 500 ships since 1951? with a rapid decline of more th8n 300
O
ships between 1963 and 1965.
In summary, the United States is dependant upon the Merchant
Marine to support the industrial economy by sea lifting many raw
materials which are not available except through importation.
Since almost ninety-nine percent of United States trade moves by
sea, United States flag merchant shipping contributes in the
distribution of finished goods to the world market and C8n be an
effective tool in controling the United States lagging balance of
payments.
In time of national emergency, the strategic objectives of
the United States dictates there be in existence sufficient
merchant shipping to promptly meet the sealift requirements in




Military Sea Transport Service, p. 214.
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During both World War I and World War II, the merchant
marine's capability Had to be greatly increased in order to support
the huge military needs of the Armed Forces. Thus following
World War II, e sizable portion of retired wartime merchant
shipping was placed in the National Defense Reserve Fleet,
preserved for future mobilization to augment the active merchant
marine if necessary in times of emergency. This reserve fleet
was called upon in both the Korean and Viet Nam conflicts,
however; age is rapidly overtaking any future usefulness of the
NDRF.
The military Sea Transport Service operating a smsll nucleus
fleet in peace time provides special logistic support to deployed
military units in the remote corners of the world. In time of
emergency, MSTS asmumes the major mission of controlling and
coordinating the flow of W8r material, sealifted by the merchant
marine for the comb8t forces.

CHAPTER IV
THE STATE 01- THE Ul.ITED STATES
MERCHANT MARINE
As we move out of the 1960's and toward the prosperity
forecast for the 1970' e, the outlook for the United States
Merchant Marine seems to have a dark cloud over it. The United
States Merchant Fleet with less than 1,000 active ships totaling
1^.5 million deadweight tons is shrinking at a rate of four percent
per year.
The duel function served by the merchant marine, th8t of a
service industry in peacetime, and an arm of the defense establish-
ment in wartime, has led to uncertainty and confusion both in
legislation and administration. As an industry, it is torn by
special interest groups on both sides of labor and management. It
has lagged far behind other industries in research and development.
It is faced with the problem of block obsolescence of most of the
World War II ships. For these end other reasons the maritime in-
dustry lacks attractiveness to private capital investment.
Inventory of Equipment
The oceangoing United States-Flag Merchant Marine, as of





ACTIVE, OCEANGOING UNITED STATES-FLAG
MERCHANT FLEET I965









Total 949 9,951 14,324
Source: United States Department of Commerce.
The total numbers in Table IV are useful in making comparisons
with other nations such as the USSR. However, these totals include
ocean vessels in domestic trade and do not include the inactive
government owned National Defense Reserve Fleet of 8bout 1,367 ships
and ten million gross tons.
Of those vessels engaged in the merchant fleet's foreign trade,
approximately three hundred are liners operating under operating-
differential subsidy contracts. They are listed in Table VI to
show size of the subsidized and liner fleet, as compared with the
contract/bulk (irregular service) fleet.
U. S. Department of Commerce. Employment Report of U. S.-Flag





UNITED STATES-FLAG OCEANGOING MERCHANT
FLEET IN FOREIGN TRADE, I965
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Source: U. S. Department of Commerce 1
The groupings and figures in Table VI vary from day to day as
titles are transferred to the government as partial payment on
replacement vessels; or under charter arrangements to the government
or between subsidized and non-subsidized operators] or in transfers
of flag to and from United States registry.
The National Defense Reserve Fleet of 1,367 vessels, ten




September, 1965, must also be listed in an inventory of what the
United States has available in merchant shipping. 1
TABLE VI
ACTIVE PRIVATE UNITED STATES-FLAG OCEANGOING

















Sub Total 313 2,711 3,537
Tramps












Source: U. S. Department of Commerce2
The fleet was established by the Ship Sales Act of 1946, and in
1950, totaled 2,277 ships. It has provided a reservoir of ships,
intended for quick activation or for ship exchange transactions. It





Quality of Equipment in Service
The two hundred and ninety-five ships of the subsidized
operators may be considered among the world's best. The approxi-
mately two hundred and eighty freighters of this category contain
four times as many twenty-knot cargo liners as the rest of the
world combined. It is this group of modern, efficient ships that
carried forty percent of the total foreign trade carried by United
States ships in 1964, including tramp and tankers' cargoes. These
ships are modern, some highly mechanized , and relatively new.
In the past seven years, a hundred and twenty-three ships have
been replaced by new construction. 2 In 1964, thirty-seven of the
thirty-nine ships under subsidized construction were being built
with mechanized improvements, 3 an(j twenty-seven ships were being
considered for retrofitted mechanized features. These improvements
include such features as bow thrust propellers, semi-automation of
boilers, remote control and centralized control of engines and
machinery, and the automatic logging and display of performance
data, alarms and engine orders. The entire fleet of subsidized
ships, about two hundred and ninety-five vessels, must, by contract
be replaced by the late 1970' s to insure their modernity.
All of the ships being built as replacements include mechani-
zation features, which will permit crew reductions up to twenty-five
-^U. S. Department of Commerce, Annual Report of the Maritime
Administration







percent. Recent editions of the trade magazine of marine
engineering, "The Engineering/Log" contain many references to the
advances in mechanization and shipbuilding such as appeared with
the delivery of the Louise Lyke
s
, the first of twelve ships of a
new class of cargo liners. She is the first American built trans-
ocean liner to have a bow-thrust propeller unit and the first to
have rotary-hinged hatch covers. She also demonstrates the in-
creased use on American ships of inorganic zinc metal coatings and
epoxies, which are intended to reduce labor costs for the continued,
p
normal painting and maintenance upkeep.
Another first in automated boiler control is recorded for the
Washington Mail . This system permits the burning of low cost, low
quality residual fuels and saves on manpower.
There have also been some interesting proposals made which are
under consideration. One proposal is for float-on-float-off barge
carrying ships which offers the huge advantage of preloading of
individual barges and assembling them for float-on to the barge
ship. This would result in rapid, turn around time, and reduce
h
port congestion.
Another is the use of the two counter rotating propellers on a
single shaft. This would allow high speeds on reduced horsepower.




Marine Engineering/Log Vol. LXX No. 11, October, 1965.
3Marine Engineering/Log Vol. LXIX No. 7, June, 1964.
^ 1965 Annual Report of the Maritime Administration
,
(Washington
U. S. Government Printing Office), 1900.
,
p. ti.
5 lbid. , 1967, p. 41.

^3
The Act of 1936 is intended to subsidize operating expenses of
liners in order to enable them to compete on equal terms with
foreign vessels that have lower labor costs. The Act does not
guarantee a profit to the liners, however, and the liner companies
must sell transportation. They must market their services
competitively and strive to operate efficiently, Just as any other
industry, in order to make a profit. Evidence of healthy activity
in this competition is demonstrated by recent advertisements by
subsidized liner companies for regular sailings of the newest inno-
vation of containerships to North European ports.
On February 14, 1966, United States Lines advertised the first
containership service to Europe, to commence March 18, 1966. This
would become a weekly sailing from New York with high speed cros-
sings in six and a half days at twenty-one knots by four new,
especially designed containerships. The appeal to the shipper in
containerized cargo is for: (1) reduced handling costs, (2)
elimination of pilfering and cargo protection, (3) reduced insur-
ance rates, (4) reduced packing costs.
On February 17, 1966, the Moore-McCormack Lines were quick to
Ifollow with an advertisement in the press of their invitation for
aids to construct four container, roll-on/roll-off cargo liners to
cruise at twenty-five knots and sail to North European Trade routes.
With regard to the approximately one hundred and eighty
private tramp ships of dry cargo and tanker type in foreign
^
•The Washington Post , February 14 , 1966., p. ( .
2The Washington Post, February 17, 1966., p. A20.
1
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trade, the quality is far from adequate. The contrast between thes^
vessels and those of the liner service is vivid. These ships are
largely World War II-built and now twenty years old or more. There
are approximately thirty-six tankers engaged in oversees foreign
trade and approximately one hundred and twenty tramp, dry cargo
vessels. The tankers are old, obsolete, and inefficient, surviving
mainly by carrying dry bulk cargoes under the cargo preference
2program.
The dry cargo vessels in irregular service are mainly old
Liberty ships with some Victory and C-type hulls included. They
are war-built, of relatively small capacity and inefficient as
compared with modern bulk carriers. Their contribution to United
States trade is examined in subsequent paragraphs.
Contribution to United States Foreign Trade
The contributions to foreign trade United States-flag merchant
shipping is making will be listed in three categories, which are
(1) overall percentage of United States foreign trade export and
import carried by United States-flag ships, (2) percentage carried
by subsidized lines, and (3) percentage carried in irregular service
The volume of cargo carried by United States-flag vessels in
United States foreign trade has declined and is demonstrated by the
drop from sixty-five million tons in 1946 to thirty-five million
Merch
MJ. S. Department of Commerce, Employment Report of U.S. -Flag
ant Ves
s
els of 1,000 Gross Tons and Over, September 30, 19^5.
U. S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, Changln
Patterns in U. S. Trade and Sh ipping Capacity
,
(Washington: U. S.




tons in i960. The total United States foreign trade carried by
ocean vessels has grown from one hundred million tons in 1946 to
two hundred and eighty-five million tons in i960.
The decline in total cargo carried by United States-flag
vessels in United States foreign trade is shown by percentages in
Table VII.
TABLE VII
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CARGO BY VOLUME CARRIED BY U. S.-FLAG
VESSELS IN U.S. FOREIGN TRADE, 1945 TO I963






Source: U. S. Department of Commerce2
When foreign trade is divided into imports end exports, the
percentage, by volume, carried by United States-flag vessels in
I963 was fourteen percent of the imports and five percent of the
exports .
Still another way to assess the participation of United States
U. S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Resources for Security
and Trade . Final Report of the Maritime Evaluation Committee,
(Washington, 1963) p. 2.
p
U. S. Department of Commerce, Cha nging Patterns in U.S. Trade
and Shipping Capacity , 1964
.
3 Ibid., pp. 4-13.
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flag vessels in foreign trade is to categorize trade carriage by
type of service. In this manner, in 1963, United States liners
carried 29.2 percent of liner cargoes: United States-flag irregular
service, dry cargo vessels carried 5.2 percent of dry cargo while
United States-flag tankers carried 4.4 percent of tanker cargoes.
Liner Service
Of the total cargo in United States foreign trade carried by
freighters in liner service, the United States-flag liners carried
twenty-nine percent in 1963. This percentage has been quite con-
stant for the past five years, ranging from 29.9 percent in 1959
to 27.3 percent in 1961. This trade has been stable in volume,
also for the five year period 1959-1963> averaging about forty-
seven million tons. Of this amount about thirty-six million tons




In 1963, United States-flag liners carried thirty-one percent
of the total liner exports and twenty-six percent of the total
liner imports.
Irregular Service
The tonnage of cargo carried in irregular service in United
States foreign trade in 1963* by s11 nationalities, was 139*5






Department of Commerce projections for the 1965-1975 period show
a sharp increase in this volume. For coal, the increase in ten
years is projected as a rise of fifty million tons. 1 However, of
the 139.5 million tons, United States-flag tramp ships and
industrial carriers carried only five percent.
Tankers
In 1963> tanker exports from the United States totaled 13-9
million tons of which 6.9 million, about one half, were agriculture
products and chemicals. Of this total, United States-flag tankers
carried three million tons, (twenty percent of tanker exports)
mostly agricultural products. United States-flag tankers in 1963
carried imports to the United States of 2.6 million tons (2.3




The Increases in total tonnages of irregular service cargoes
and tanker cargoes in United States foreign trade serve to high-
light the very small percentages which are carried by United States-
flag vessels. However, the large share of government-sponsored
cargoes United States-flag vessels obtain through the Cargo
Preference Act tends to offset, financially, the poor showing of




the government-sponsored cargo that keeps these vessels in business.
The comparison shown in Table VIII shows this dependence graphically
TABLE VIII
COMPARISON OF PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED CARGOES
CARRIED BY U.S. -FLAG VESSELS
Type of
Service U.S. -Flag Percent U.S. -Flag percent
of Tot8l Commercial of Government-
U.S. Foreign Trade Sponsored Ca v








Source: U. S. Department of Commerce.
Rate of Growt h
The additions to the United States Merchant Fleet come either
from new construction, transfers of registries, or activations
(private or government) of ships of the National Defense Reserve
Fleet (NDRF).
The number of ships built in American shipyards for the past
five years is shown in Table IX, and the number of transfers from
United States registry is appended. The effect is a net loss of
United States-flae; shipping.








MERCHANT VESSELS CONSTRUCTED IN U.S. SHIPYARDS






























Sources: (a) Annual Reports of U.S. Maritime Administration
(b) U.S. Department of Commerce
The best hope of additions to the American merchant fleet lies
in the construction of liner-type vessels for the subsidized lines,
as required by the contract program for operating-subsidies. Of
the two hundred and ninety-four vessels required to be built, one
hundred and twenty-three have been delivered, or are under construe
tion.
However, the construction of the remaining one hundred and
(a) A nnual Reports of U.S. Maritime Administration (196l
through 1965).
(b) U.S. Department of Commerce. This is MARAD .
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seventy-one vessels will undoubtedly, be a slow process, to Judpe
from the fiscal year 1967 budget, which provides for the construction
of Just thirteen new vessels as part of this continuing program.
This amount will add modernity to the fleet, but will not make up
for the number of ships which are transferred.
There has been criticism of the speed at which the replacement
program is progressing. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines chairman,
Admiral John M. Will, is quoted by Marine Engineering/Log magazine
as stating that we are sixty-six ships behind in the program, because
the government has not provided the funds for its share of the
construction costs. Construction of twenty-six to tventy-seven
ships this year and each following year is advocated by the editorial,
staff of the Marine Engineering/Log .
tySSR Merchant Fleet
The United States' twenty new ships (335,000 deadweight tons)
compares poorly with the gains of the Soviet Union, the world's most
rapidly growing maritime power. The USSR is adding more than
1,000,000 deadweight tons annually through new ship construction in
Russia, Poland, East Germany, Finland, Hollard, Sweden, and Japan,
and through ship purchases on the world market.
The Soviet Merchant Marine is state-owned and operated and quasi
military in nature. It has evolved from Lenin's decree of 1918,
nationalizing the ships of Russian private shipping firms. In 19l8>
^Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget, The
Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 1967 , P. 39. (To be updated based on
FYby Budget).




this fleet amounted to only 865,000 deadweight tons.
In 1921, in order to foster the foreign trade urgently needed
by the new Soviet nation, ships were purchased abroad, chartered,
and a few built within the USSR. By 1931, Soviet ships carried ten
percent of Soviet foreign trade. By 1957, however, the expanding
Soviet-flag merchant fleet carried about fifty percentof all Soviet
pUnion exports and imports.
Today, the fleet available to the Soviet Union totals some
eight million deadweight tons. The fact that the Soviet Union is
committing significant resources and foreign exchange towards a
growing merchant fleet shows her intention to penetrate the world
trade routes and increase her trade with both communist countries
and the free world.
By lPBO shipbuilding by Soviet bloc and western shipyards will,
at present rates, provide the USSR with a fleet of over twenty
million tons. This may prove to be the equivalent of the British
Merchant Fleet and may be the largest, most modern fleet in the
world, well able to dominate World trade.
^
Project WALRUS Study
Project WALRUS, a 1959 summer study, was a principal function
of the Maritime Research Advisory Committee of the National Academy
a. M. Kassell, "The Soviet Merchant Fleet," United States
Naval Institute Proceedings , Vol. XXCVI, pi. 3, (March, 190O,)
2
Ibid.
3Noel Mostert, "Russia Bids for Ocean Supremacy," The Reporter
,
Vol. XXXIV, n. 3, (February 10, 1966).
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of Sciences—National Research Council in conjunction with the
Maritime Administration on the "nature, organization, and prosecution
of a scientific research and development program" appropriate to the
Maritime Administration's objectives and responsibilities. The
initially stated objective of Project WALRUS was: "to examine
present and future military demands on the United States Merchant
Marine in order that technical requirements can be derived for
maritime research and development planning."
The scope of the Project was later broadened to encompass the
national security role of the United States Merchant Marine; and a
major demand was placed on the Merchant Marine by the intensifying-
political-economic conflict, the cold war into which the United
States has been inescapably drawn.
As a result of this study many old facts were confirmed. The
key features of the study are summarized as follows:
a. The United States Merchant Marine is deteriorating in that
most of the ships are nearly over age and outmoded from the stand-
point of modern design.
b. United States flag shipping is carrying a steadily decreas-
ing portion of United States trade (twelve percent in 1958--this
percentage is even less today).
c. The United States is in danger of losing its "flags of
convenience" fleet which carries about one third of its foreign
trade and over which the government is considered to now have
-•Panel on Wartime Use of the United States Merchant Marire,
The Role of the United States Merchant Marine in National Security
,








d. The current rate of subsidy funding shows small promise of
assuring timely replacement of the subsidized segment of the United
States-flag fleet.
e. Most owners of non-subsidized United States-flag ships have
little incentive for even starting a replacement program. This
decline is of serious concern to the government, to industry, and
most particularly to the military services.
f. Energetic leadership is required to correct the above trends
g. The Merchant Marine should be prepared to plan a significant
national security role.
h. The United States must use its Merchant Marine defensively
and as a positive weapon of the cold war, to counter the economic
thrusts of its opponents who are building stronger and larger
merchant fleets to carry a larger share of international trade. The
United States flag fleet is in danger of becoming unable to meet
the challenge and the continued ability of the "flags of convenience"
fleet to serve as an instrument of national policy is threathened.
i. United States flag shipping, augmented by the "flags of
convenience" fleet, is adequate in quantity to meet reasonable
expectations of defense needs, at least through 1965. The fleet in
general, however, is qualitatively deficient for defense purposes
because of inadequate speed, relatively low cargo-handling rates




J. Jn the event of a general nuclear war, the Merchant Marine
could play a vital role in rescue, rehabilitation, and restoration.
It is likely to be the least damaged national transportation re-
source; however, this role should not dominate maritime planning. A
foresighted, positive program to meet cold and limited war needs
will go a long war toward producing an effective fleet for general
war tasks.
k. National security maritime needs can be largely met by the
construction and modernization of a fleet which can be commercially
competitive with minimum subsidy. Both security and commercial
interests can effectively use balanced speed in cargo handling and
ocean transit, unitization of cargoes, and automation of ship
operations to attain their goals. Such features entail capital
intensification in order to reduce the number of man-days required
to load, transit, and discharge the ship's load.
1. For national security purposes, the military services
require a number of special ships having "over the beach" cargo
handling capability. These ships may even prove effective in spec-
ial commercial operations, such as meeting world competition in
under-developed countries that have limited port facilities. Such
utility as an instrument of national economic policy deserves
thorough exploration.
The WALRUS Project concluded by citing three main steps which
should be taken now to assure a strong merchant marine in support




Ijamediate action by the Government is required to
avoid the flight of • flags of convenience' shipping from
effective U.S. control to uncontrolled registries under
European flags. Some degree of exodus has already started.
The Government should be prepared to take the lead
in enlisting the co-operation of maritime labor and man-
agement to produce a technologically feasible fleet which
will be commercially competitive with minimum subsidy.
Without significant improvement in the attitudes of both
labor and management towards technological advances, we
can achieve no sound basis for competitive objectives.
The goal of the Maritime Administration's Research
and Development Program should be established as the
creation of a U.S. merchant fleet which can be self-sup-
porting without subsidy; and the Program should be so





TRENDS FOR THE FUTURE
Economic
A declining seagoing fleet has been portrayed which, each
year, carried less and less volume of the nation's commerce. Yet,
at this same time of decline, signs of a hard-core of health and
modernity is apparent in the form of the subsidized liner fleet.
At the current rate of replacement, if continued, the United
States-flag merchant fleet should stabilize at approximately two
hundred and forty ships by 198O. By that time, the National Defense
Reserve Fleet will have passed into complete obsolescence, and the
United States-flag tramp and tanker fleets will have followed.
But, perhaps the picture is not that dark. The United States
does possess, in its subsidized fleet, a firm foundation for
merchant marine expansion, although the foundation, itself, depends
on the enlightened implementation of the Merchant Marine Act of
1936. With this basis in material and policy, the United States
can move ahead with a merchant fleet, which is balanced in type for
the current cargo patterns, adapted to United States defense and
commercial needs, and growing in its participation in United States
and foreign trade.
Certainly the trends in United States foreign trade substantiate





trade projection based upon a United States Gross National Product
(GNP) for 1985 of $l,250-billion. 1 This projection shows both the
value and the volume of ocean-borne foreign commerce doubling in
the next 20 years. The volume projection shows a substantial change
in the type of cargo to be carried with bulk cargo (dry and liquid)
doubling while the volume of general cargo remains virtually steady.
TABLE X
VOLUME OF U.S. OCEANBORNE FOREIGN COMMERCE
(IN MILLIONS OF LONG TONS)
1966 1975 1985
General Cargo 51 59 69
Dry Bulk Cargo 152 237 38l
Liquid Bulk Cargo 136 175 235
Total 339 ^71 685
Source: Interagency Maritime Task Force Report2
Military Air/Sea Lift
In 1962 5 the Secretary of Defense convinced that passengers
could be more effectively transported by air, recommended the
deactivation of sixteen passenger ships operated by the Military
lAlan S. Boyd, The Merchant Marine in National Defense and
T rade, A Policy and a Program, by the Interagency Maritime Task
Force under the direction of "Alan S. Boyd, Under Secretary of
Commerce for Transportation, October 4, 1965.




Sea Transport Service. 1 However, with the left capacity of present
day aircraft movement of large numbers of people is costly.
A more meaningful cost comparison in military terms can be
obtained from an examination of "Operation Big Lift 1 and ' Operation
Steel Pike I.' Steel Pike was an amphibious exercise held in
October, 1964, in which 28,000 Marines and 90,000 tons of cargo
were transported in ten merchant ships and seven MSTS ships to
Spain in ten days, landed ashore for four days' maneuvers, reem-
o
barked and returned to the United States. The cost of the
exercise wss $7 million. 3 in October, 1963, Operation Big Lift
moved 15,358 troops from Fort Hood, Texas to Germany in three days
and later returned them to the United States for $20 billion. In
addition, all the equipment for Big Lift has been previously moved
to Europe by ship and stored until needed.
The C-5A aircraft, when placed into service in 1971, will have
a capability to lift fifty tons of equipment or six hundred troops,
its justification rests in its ability for quick response, not as
a replacement for surface transportation of cargo.
To interface with the increased airlift capability of the
1970*s, the Department of Defense has sponsored the development of
a Fast Deployment Logistics ship (FDL) . With huge roll-on/roll-off
capability to handle military hardware plus an over the beach
landing ability, the FDL along with the C-5A transport aircraft will
!u.S. Congress, House, Hearings, Review of Merchant Marine
Policy , 1962, 87th Cong. 2nd Sess. (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1962), p. 88.










represent a major improvement In immediate response to "brush fire'
or relatively small limited-war operations. The existence of a
substantial number of these new FDL ships will also reduce the
number of conventional ships needed to sustain larger overseas
operation. The FDL would be used as forward mobile depots stationed
close to potential trouble areas, and loaded with military equipment
required by airlifted combat forces. These ships would not be
involved in point-to-point transportation operations except when
they have discharged their cargo at a world trouble spot, they could
be turned around and placed into service In the supply pipe line.
Under no conditions would these ships be used to carry peace time
1
cargo.
Although the program has the complete support of the Department
of Defense and the Administration, it has generated substantial
opposition from the maritime industry the shipbuilder's industry,
and the maritime labor unions.
The cause of concern in the maritime industry and labor unions
is the fear of competition in the movement of cargo, automated
2
materials handling equipment and manning levels.
The shipbuilding industry is totally against the proposed
3
method of procurement that the Defense Department has endorsed.
^-D. W. Wilson. Captain U.S.N. . "A new Emphasis on Crisis''.
Navy the Magazine of Sea Power (May. 1965) pp. 11-14.
^Washington Star February 2. IQ67
- p. al6.
^Kelly, Orr, Capitol Coolness Dismays Backers of Logistics Ship
Washington Sunday Star, April lb. 1967., p. A15.
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In an effort to force modernize tion of ship construction methodL,
the intentions are to grant a single contract or total package
approach covering all phases of the estimated twenty to thirty ship
building project.
The major advantages of this form of procurement, according to
the Department of Defense, would be standardization of ships and,
thus, a reduction in the wide range of spare parts necessary to
support the fleet. The second major reduction is in the construction
costs. It is felt that multiple copy productions of ships would
produce considerate cost savings.
Along with proposals for total package contracts on fourteen
other types of ships, the shipbuilding industry is fearful that the
fourteen major construction yards would shrink to five or seven
highly automated shipyards. This fear and resistance is further
increased because Department of Defense account for some eighty
2
percent of all United States ship construction.^
The fiscal year 1968. Defense Department budget contained a
request for five FDL ships, however, Congress, fearful of furthering
the United States capability to become a global policeman" may
3
not approve this segment of the FDL program.
Government Studies
Executive Order III56 established the Maritime Advisory
Ibid.
Washington Star . April lo . 1067 . p. A15.
^The Wall Street Journal. March 22, 1067. p. 1.
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Committee consisting of fifteen representatives of Maritime manage-
ment, Labor, and the public. The Committee advises theSecretary
of Labor and the Secretary of Commerce on matters of policy and
administration for strengthening the trade, national defense, man-
power and labor relations programs of the Maritime industry. At
the duration of the Committee, an Interagency Maritime Task Force
was formed in June, 19&5.. under the chairmanship of then Under
Secretary of Commerce, Alan S. Boyd.
The proposed program would bring in some ships not now eligible
for subsidy, would launch a new construction program of five bulk,
cargo ships a year, and would encourage the earliest automation of
all United States vessels in both domestic and foreign trade.
The proposed changes would substitute direct, visible aids for
most of the present indirect subsidies, and would streamline the aid
systems to allow greater freedom of operation, more encouragement
toward productive, profitable operation, and less detailed govern-
ment interference.
It would halt the steady, year-to-year increase in subsidy
spending, starting in I966. If current programs were continued, the
cost of maritime subsidy in 1966 would be $4l6 million. Under the
new proposal, the expenditure would be $402 million.
At the end of the twenty-year-period, these savings would amount
to about $217 million a year. The Federal outlay in 1985 is set at
$377 million as against a total $594 million which v.ould be required
^oyd Report , pp. 7-44.
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If present programs were continued.
A major share of these saving would come from a phase-out of
passenger ship subsidies and gradual elimination of cargo preferences
There are thirteen passenger liners currently under subsidy,
representing an ann-ial outlay of $^7 million.
The cost of the cargo preference program, under which United
States shipping is guaranteed a percentage of Government-originated
cargo, is reckoned in the hundreds of millions.
At the same time the subsidy program would be extended to some
ships not now included and would provide for a snipbuilding program
that would bring in others.
Some forty unsubsidized csrgo liners would become eligible, and
a five-year construction subsidy program calling for five new dry
bulk cargo ships a year would be instituted. This program would be
reviewed and evaluated at the end of five years.
The Secretaries of Defense and Commerce would determine the
Level of private shipbuilding capacity required by national security
considerations
.
After contracts are let for that level of construction in
lomestic yards. American shipping companies would be free to build or
repair ships abroad without subsidy support and without limita-
tion as to the number of ships.
These ships would be eligible for all privileges of United
(States registry, and would be eligible for operating subsidies if
hey met the new requirements . This would include foreign-built ves-
els under five years old.
The annual merchant-marine-related Government spending in
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private shipyards amounts to $152 million annually, or about five
percent of the total Government input into the shipyard industry,
for both military and civilian ship construction.
The proposal does not cover domestic shipping, but it would
allow domestic shippers to buy ships or equipment in foreign yards
also. The report noted that ''domestic shipping is the only mode of
domestic transportation required to purchase its equipment solely in
the United States." Other modes such as airlines, trucks, rails,
etc., do buy foreign-built equipment when it is to their advantage
to do so, it added.
In the field of maritime labor, the program calls for applica-
tion of maximum automation at as fast a rate as technology will
permit, and establishment of manning scales at minimum levels consis-
tent with safety and the advance of technology.
The report predicts that 'over the next twenty years, under
present programs, maritime labor may be confronted with a significant
loss in the level of employment opportunity. The proposed program
combats this trend and stimulates the industry-s economic growth
thus creating new long term stable job potentials. The new program
provides more future jobs than will present policies. It does this
by encouraging increased productivity through fostering the applica-
tion of new technology and manning standards.
The proposal suggests Government-participation in labor-manage-
ment discussions seeking equitable settlement of employment and
manning problems.
The report suggests such possible programs of adjustments as
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grsdujted retirement, vesting of pension rights, severance pay
special automation funds.
Under the proposed program, the Maritime Administration would
keep a close watch over participation by subsidized operators In
shipping conferences, especially those which maintain unfair freight
rates which tend to impede tn.° flow of United States Commerce.
Those receiving subsidy will, in fact, be encouraged to operate
outside the conference setups where possible.
The phase-down and eventual elimination of cargo preference
requirements is described as an integral part of the bulk carrier
program feature.
The report predicts that with the disappearance due to age and
deterioration of the tramp fleet, a modern bulk carrier fleet should
emerge. This would eliminate the need for cargo preference and shou]
have a bearing on the future job market in the maritime industry as
world trade continues to expand and grow.
The United States' foreign commerce, based on the Council of
Economic Advisors' predictions on the growth of the Gross National
Product, could reach $60 billion by the end of the twenty-year
proposed urogram.
The Interagency Maritime Task Fcrce rteport was rejected In
total by resolution of the President's Maritime Advisory Committee
on the grounds that it was based on assumption contrary to the
Mercahnt Marine Act of 1936.1 Further, the release of the report
brought cries of outrage(and still is) from all corners of the
^U.S. Dept. of Commerce press release G-65-160, Oct. 7, 1965.
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maritime industry, labor unions and the-LEhipbuilders.
Most recent proposals from the new Department of Transporta-
tion, and being circulated informally within the maritime industry,
recommend three basic steps be taken to improve the lot of the
American Merchant Marine. The first calls for the Government to
provide about $200-million annually for five years In construction
subsidies to build fifteen U.S. flag ships. These subsidies would
be paid directly to the shipyards.
The second proposal would provide operating subsidies to
foreign built bulk dry cargo ships and tankers. The third recom*
mendation would allow foreign built U.S. flag merchant ships operate
pin U.S. Domestic trade.
These proposals have been generally endorsed by the American
Merchant Marine Institute (the nation's most powerful maritime
industry association which represents almost half of the merchant
shipping). 3 The Committee of American Steamship Liners-^represent-
ing ell but one of the nation's steamship lines) and three labor
unions have also endorsed the Department of Transportation proposals?
l-Buslness Week March 18, 1967 pp. 173-176.
2Th< Wall Street Journal March 22. 1967, P» 3.
3American Merchant Marine Institute Press Information Letter
dated March 20, 1967. for release on March 21, 1967
•
i4The Wall Street Journal March 22, 1967 p. 3.
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In summary, the Department of Defense appears to be determined
to creete a sealift and airlift completely responsive to very
limited resources W8s wholly within the control of the Secretary of
Defense.
An Interagency Maritime Task. Force with representatives from;
Bureau of the Budget, Council of Economic Advisor, Department of
State. Defense. Agriculture, Labor and Commerce, prepared a program
to foster a competitive merchant marine, balanced in type of ships
for the cargoes expected in the future and subsidized only to the
extent required to produce basic national defense needs.
The program was rejected, however, in its place there is
emergency plsns for modernizing the shipping industry within the




The United States has always been a maritime nation and, at
this moment in history, the sea is more important to Americans than
ever before. The American foreign policy is more comprehensive and
more far-reaching then ever before, and America is enabled by sea
power to provide aid and protection to victims of aggression on a
world wide scale. American industrial growth is more dependent than
heretofor on raw materials supplied from abroad by the merchant
vessel.
Government monetary assistance to ship operation has evolved
through the years to culminate in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936
which, notwithstanding substzntlal promotional amendments, has not
produced a growing United States-flag merchant fleet, composed "of
the best equipped, safest and most suitable types of vessels' . It
was the imperative transocean transportation needs of World War II
which Impelled the shipbuilding program responsible for building the
bulk of the present United States Merchant Fleet, and not the Act of
1936. Furthermore, since World War II, the United States-flag
merchant fleet has declined in numbers of active ships and amounts
of tonnage. It has declined drastically in the percentage of imports
and exports carried in United States foreign trade until it now




irregular service and tank trade have shown the greatest decline.
These ships would not be in operation today, if they did not have
governmental assistance through cargo preference laws, which provide
for preference being given to United States-flag vessels in the
carrying of substantial amounts of government-generated cargoes.
As if to emphasize the United States Merchant Marine's decline
is the remarkable growth of the merchant fleet, which is available
to the Soviet Union. If the "Cold War" shifts or has shifted from
power confrontations to coexistence and economic warfare, the USSR
has the means in her merchant fleet to compete powerfully on a
global scale.
Despite the decline in numbers and participation in United
States foreign trade, the United States-flag merchant fleet has a
vital and progressive element in the three hundred ships of the
liner service. These ships are the subsidy construction and replace
ment ships which sail with an operating differential subsidy. They
are modern, fast, safe ships, employing modern, mechanical, labor-
saving devices. They can compete in an international environment
only because of the governmental subsidies which offset the high
costs of American labor. There is substantial proof of the need
for government subsidy if the merchant fleet is to survive in its
present environment. If present policies continue the United States
flag fleet will continue to decline until about 250 modern vessels
remain, 8nd these will not be in the right proportion, by type, to
sarry the increasing amounts of bulk cargo which trade predictions
forecast for American trade. Further, the fleet will not, in the
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future, provide the ships in numbers for a military contingency of
any but the most limited type.
An increase of special airlift/sealif t capability directly
under the control of the Department of Defense points to less
reliance on the Merchant Marine in future National Emergencies,
short of an external war. The prevailing view of the administration
spokesmen seems to be that free enterprise must have fostered, to
the extent possible within the frame work of the national goals
stated in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.
Conclusion
Under current programs the strength and capability of the
merchant marine relative to the expected volume of United States
foreign trade, will continue to decline despite the aims of those
programs.
Block obsolescence of merchant marine ships presents a procure-
ment problem of greater magnitude than present procurement plans can
satisfy.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936, in effect, places the shipping
and shipbuilding industries in a single subsidy base which makes the
two industries interdependent upon one another.
The operating differential subsidy that now exists does not
provide a strong enough incentive to operators for increased
productivity and cost effectiveness.
United States shipping industry should be permitted to have
ships constructed in foreign yards unless shipbuilding costs in the
United States can be lowered noticeably.
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It is difficult to Justify having subsidies to an outmoded
passenger liner fleet in the light of definite shortages in bulk dry
cargo and wet cargo ship categories.
Labor and management should consolidate forces in both their
houses and jointly strive to build a competitive industry or run
the risk of expanded government intervention.
In spite of the fact the Boyd Report was totally rejected, it
served one basic purpose, it twisted the tiger's tail and brought a
solid front of reaction in way of complacency.
Recommendations
In order to develop a more economically effective Merchant
Marine, it is recommended:
a) Definitive requirement for United States-flag shipping
capability be developed and formed into a national Maritime policy.
b) The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 be amended to permit
American shipping operations to:
1) Purchase foreign built ships for operation in the
foreign trades under United States registry, and eligible for the
same operation subsidies and benefits available to United States
built ships.
2) Purchase foreign built ships for operation in
domestic trade under United States registry.
c) That a study be made of the United States shipbuilding
industry with a vain toward reducing ship construction costs through
modern large scale production techniques.

71
d) That the present operating differentials subsidy be
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